Event
- Event ID
- 223
- Quality
- Description
The vent occurred in the ammonia production unit.
A minor leak had been detected in a flange on the piping of the ammonia synthesis loop (operating at 250 bar). The company called a specialized external contractor to perform an on-stream repair of the valve. This solution was chosen because of for the limited extents of the leakage and the economic costs and efforts associated to a shut-down of a very complex system.
The on-stream repair consisted in: (1) fabrication of a special bracket in two parts adapted to the dimensions of the flange of the valve, and (2): injection of filling material in the bracket around the flange (the material had to be injected at a pressure higher than the operating pressure inside the pipe). During the repair some stud bolts broke causing the escape of a jet of a gaseous mixture of unknown amount of hydrogen and nitrogen at 250 bars. The escaping mixture exploded, killing 2 workers and damaging the valves and the piping.- Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Flange (Bolts)
- How was it involved?
- Rupture & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
- Initiating cause
- Wrong Installation
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- INITIATING cause was the failure of a flange followed by the release of a nitrogen-hydrogen mixture.
The investigation revealed that two causes have probably contributed to the accident:
(1): the flange stud-bolts of the valve have been replaced by others made of a material not equivalent to the one originally specified;
(2): the maintenance company performing the repair have not taken into account the overpressure on the stud-bolts due to the injection of the filling material in the bracket.
Therefore the root cause could be identified in the lack of a proper risk assessment of the repairing operation.
Facility
- Application
- Chemical Industry
- Sub-application
- Fertilisers production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- flange, bolt, ammonia synthesis loop, valve, bracket
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- Following the detection of a small leak repairing works had been subcontracted, to be performed while the plant continued its operation.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 2
- Emergency action
- Despite the fact that the automatic detection and mitigation system did not function as designed, thanks to the eagle-eyed able seaman radioing to the ship’s cargo control room, the gas combustion unit was quickly shut down, and a major fire was prevented.
The unit was immediately shut down and isolated before the crew implemented the fire prevention response plan.
Lesson Learnt
- Corrective Measures
After the accident, the following measures were established:
- compilation of written maintenance procedures with emphasis on safety issues;
- establishment of the sequence of operations to be followed during repair of such valves.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas mixture
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2 75%
N2 25% - Actual pressure (MPa)
- 25
- Design pressure (MPa)
- 25
- Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
- Deflagration
- Y
- High pressure explosion
- N
- High voltage explosion
- N
References
- Reference & weblink
Event description in European database eMARS<br />
https://emars.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/emars/accident/view/81b0a851-01f8-620… />
(accessed September 2020)Event description in the French database ARIA<br />
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/176/<br />
(accessed October 2020)<br />
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- eMARS