Event
- Event ID
- 506
- Quality
- Description
- Vented hydrogen flew back into the system and exploded. Hydrogen was not vented fast enough and exceed the lower flammability limit (4% in volume).
[Zalosh and Short, 1978] - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- North America
- Country
- United States
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Electrolytic Cell
- How was it involved?
- Internal Explosion (H2-Air Mixture)
- Initiating cause
- Inadequate Venting
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The hydrogen backflow was due to a too high hydrogen production rate, which the venting system could not deal with. This suggests a ROOT CAUSE related to wrong operations. Another causal factor could be speculatively assigned to a vent design not fit for the purpose.
Facility
- Application
- Chemical Industry
- Sub-application
- Ammonia production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- Location type
- Confined
- Location description
- Unknown
- Operational condition
- Unknown (No additional details provided)
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Currency
- US$
- Property loss (onsite)
- 90000
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas mixture
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2,
Cl2 - Ignition delay
- Not reported
References
- Reference & weblink
Table II - Industrial Incidents of Appendix A of Zalosh and Short<br />
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HYDROGEN FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENTS<br />
Quarterly Report No. 2 for Period December 1, 1977 - February 28, 1978<br />
https://www.osti.gov/biblio/6566131<br />
(accessed September 2020)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- Zalosh
