Event
- Event ID
- 860
- Quality
- Description
- [Note of the event validator: according to the sources, hydrogen as combustible gas does not seems to have plaid part in this incident. However, it is more plausible that hydrogen, as the main component of the gas mixture, took part in the overall explosion, especially considering that the source speaks of the possible formation of large quantity of solid oxygen at -192 C. ]
The explosion and fire occurred at a chemical plant. The specific process affected was the separation of carbon monoxide and methane from the gas generated by partial combustion of the crude oil. This gas had as main component hydrogen. Gaseous species separation was based on liquefaction.
To fight the fire, a nitrogen purge of the combustible gas in the reactor was attempted. However, a more intense explosion occurred after two hours. During this second explosion 11 persons were killed, 44 persons got injured.
According to the source, the first explosion is believed to be caused by a nitrogen-based reaction which generated aliphatic nitro- and nitroso-compounds that are unstable and explosive. They are supposed to have accumulated and to have exploded. The cause of the second explosion is supposed to be related to (i) the fact that the insulator materials was combustibles (wool chips), and (ii) to the possibility of oxygen accumulation by extraction from air at -192 C (liquefaction temperature of CO). - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Asia
- Country
- Japan
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Heat Exchanger (Cold Box)
- How was it involved?
- Internal Explosion (H2-O2 Mixture)
- Initiating cause
- Inadequate Or Wrong Design
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was the formation of an explosive atmosphere in the separator unit.
A CONTRIBUTING CAUSE was the use of combustible insulation materials in contact with combustible gases.
The ROOT CAUSE relates to the insufficient risk assessment analysis of the process. However, these factors might have been unpredictable in the technological level at that time.
Facility
- Application
- Chemical Industry
- Sub-application
- Ammonia production
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- liquefaction/separation unit
- Location type
- Unknown
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 40
- Number of fatalities
- 11
- Currency
- yen
- Property loss (onsite)
- 240000000
- Post-event summary
- The separator was destroyed. ¥ 240 million costs.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
1. Cold insulators for very low temperature equipment should be made of incombustible materials such as perlite.
2. The impurities contained in the process materials have to be taken into account , because they are not chemically inert and may play a role in unexpected and unwanted reactions.
Event Nature
- Release type
- Gas-liquid-solid mixture
- Involved substances (% vol)
- H2,
N2,
O2 - Presumed ignition source
- Not reported
References
- Reference & weblink
JST failures database:<br />
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1000095.html<br />
(accessed Dec 2023)Process shcmea picture from JST failures database:<br />
https://www.shippai.org/fkd/en/cfen/CC1000095.html<br />
(accessed Dec 2023)
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- JST