Event
- Event ID
- 1030
- Quality
- Description
- An explosion followed by a fire occurred at a tar precipitator of gas treatment of a coke oven. The extractors were manually activated. Ten minutes later, the operator activates the internal emergency plan. The fuel supply to the installation was interrupted. Approximately two hours later the fire was extinguished by nitrogen purging.
The operator estimated the maximum amount of material that reacted in the explosion of the tar precipitator at 170 kg in TNT equivalent. In total, the operator estimated that 36,790 t of coke oven gas were released and burned at the candles (torches above the oven batteries) and flares. The coke oven gas consisted mainly of hydrogen and methane.
A crack had been identified in the steam circuit eight months before the accident, which could not be repaired without a precipitator shutdown. As the monitoring of the oxygen measurement at the precipitator outlet did not show any deviation, the repair was scheduled for the normal shutdown 3 days after the day of the accident.
Several hypotheses as to the origin of the ignition energy were put forward: electrostatic due to the friction of the air/gas mixture (also composed of dust) on the metal plates, chemical due to the presence of pyrophoric materials or mechanical due to the fall of a metal part inside the precipitator.
[ARIA event 56415] - Event Initiating system
- Classification of the physical effects
- Hydrogen Release and Ignition
- Nature of the consequences
- Macro-region
- Europe
- Country
- France
- Date
- Main component involved?
- Reactor / Oven / Furnace / Test Chamber
- How was it involved?
- Internal Explosion (H2-Air Mixture)
- Initiating cause
- Unknown
- Root causes
- Root CAUSE analysis
- The INITIATING CAUSE was a crack in the steam circuit, which probably allowed air access to the precipitator.
The third-party expert report concluded that the most probable hypothesis was that the mixture of coke oven gases came into contact with the oxygen in the air coming from the leakage of the steam network and ignited by the electrostatic energy generated by the friction of the gases on the metal walls.
The decision to continue operation after the detection of a crack in the steam circuit can be considered the ROOT CAUSE of this incident. This decision was based on the measure of oxygen content, which did not seem to increase despite the crack.
Facility
- Application
- Steel And Metals Industry
- Sub-application
- Steel manufacturing
- Hydrogen supply chain stage
- All components affected
- steel plant, tar precipitator, coke gases
- Location type
- Open
- Location description
- Industrial Area
- Operational condition
- Pre-event occurrences
- At the moment of the incident, the precipitator was shutdown, being drained and washed.
- Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
- DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS
a tar precipitator is an electrostatic filter which collects dust and tar contained i the gas during the transformation of the coal in coke. The coke oven gas can then be used as energy source in other site processes.
Emergency & Consequences
- Number of injured persons
- 0
- Number of fatalities
- 0
- Environmental damage
- Y
- Property loss (onsite)
- Y
- Post-event summary
- The tar precipitation unit was destroyed.
The estimated volume of coke oven gas burned at the candles and the flare was 3 776 600 Nm³.
Flaring of the coke oven gas followed for 90 days until the tar precipitator was replaced.
In total, the operator estimates that 36,790 t of coke oven gas were released and burned at the candles and flares. The operator carried out a health assessment and modelled the emission of SO2 which, was considered the only pollutant resulting from combustion which could have an impact on the population. They concluded that the daily average limit value for the protection of human health, the information and recommendation threshold and the alert threshold were not exceeded.
Lesson Learnt
- Lesson Learnt
- Explosions in an electrostatic tar precipitator had already occurred on this site in July 2005 and on other sites of the group abroad in November 2017 and in 2019. However, these explosions always occurred during the restarting of the precipitator by powering the electric fields, never during the washing and draining phases when the electric fields are not powered (no source of ignition). There was therefore no feedback and this risk had not been identified by the operator.
- Corrective Measures
- Following this accident, the operator reviewed the risk analyses and took additional measures, including a review of the washing procedure for the tar precipitator by carrying out the washing and draining operations under pressure, to avoid air ingress.
Event Nature
- Release type
- gas mixture (coke oven gas)
- Involved substances (% vol)
- Mainly H2
CH4
CO
CO2 - Released amount
- 36790 t
- Presumed ignition source
- Static electricity
References
- Reference & weblink
ARIA 56415 full report
JRC assessment
- Sources categories
- ARIA