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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Detection alarm in compressor room of a mobile production facility

Event

Event ID
1188
Quality
Description
This event with minor hydrogen releases occurred during the operation of a hydrogen compressor.
The compressor was part of a mobile hydrogen production unit and connected to a bundle of cylinders with compressed hydrogen.
The room gas detector sent a firstly a low-level alarm (alarm setting value = 4,800 ppm of hydrogen in air) and the equipment was temporarily shut down. To identify the location of the leak, the equipment was restarted and checked. 15 minutes later, the detector triggered a major alarm (alarm setting value = 9,600 ppm) and the equipment was shut down. A gas reaction was confirmed from the compressor.

To identify the location of the leak, the upper, middle, and lower high-pressure compressor stages were disassembled and inspected.
Two leak locations were found:
(1) A penetration crack in the O-ring of the check valve on the discharge side of the left end cap of the high-pressure middle compressor. The two causes of this crack were a Blister phenomenon and a O-ring protrusion phenomenon due to deformation of the backup ring.
(2). A scratch in the circumferential direction on the seat surface of the pipe joint (retainer) on the suction side of the left end cap of the high-pressure lower compressor. The cause of the circumferential scratch was a damage caused by partial contact of a part with a harder hardness than the seat surface when repeatedly connecting and disconnecting the fitting.

[Note of HIAD validator: this event could be classified as near miss, if it were not for the bit unclear statement that a ‘reaction took place in the compressor’. It has now classified as a event with ignition, even if minor].
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Main component involved?
Compressor / Booster / Pump (Seal)
How was it involved?
Leak & Formation Of A Flammable H2-Air Mixture
Initiating cause
Material Degradation (Generic)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITATING CAUSE was two leaks on the compressor components.
The ROOT CAUSE were probably to be attributed to material damage, possibly due to repeated use and/or installation mishaps.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Production
Sub-application
compressor
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transfer (No additional details provided)
All components affected
Fittings
Location type
Confined
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Property loss (onsite)
0

Lesson Learnt

Corrective Measures

After the incident, the compressor was depressurised, a gas detection was performed, and after confirming that there was no reaction, it was sent to another facility for inspection and repair by the maintenance company.
The procedures for maintenance were improved with specific actions aiming at checking the integrity of the two subcomponents which failed, guaranteeing that these checks would be performed without risk of further damage.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release duration
unknown
Released amount
negligible
Hole shape
unknown
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association): <br />
https://www.khk.or.jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_inc… />
(accessed May 2025)

JRC assessment