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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Damage to the insulation sell of a LH2 tank

Event

Event ID
459
Quality
Description
During the warm-up phase of a large liquid hydrogen sphere, the annular space was over-pressurised and perlite insulation was expelled through the evacuation nozzle and the burst diaphragm. Air had leaked into the annular space some weeks earlier and repairs had been carried out. However, the air had solidified in the annular space. During the warm-up, the air vaporised and caused a pressure build-up. The vessel sustained minor damage.

[Ordin, NASA (1974)]
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
No Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Macro-region
North America
Country
United States
Date
-
Main component involved?
Cryogenic Insulation Shell
How was it involved?
Internal Explosion (Hp Explosion)
Initiating cause
Over-Pressurisation (Loss Of Vacuum)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
Leak points had been found in the external shell and sealed approximately six weeks prior to this event. The event was due to a lack of design considerations for monitoring/ evaluating the tank conditions during warmup. The hazards involved in making temporary re­pairs in the evacuation system were not iden­tified.
Therefore, the ROOT CAUSES were shortcoming in repairing procedures and n asesing the related risks.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Stationary Storage
Sub-application
aerospace
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Storage (No additional details provided)
All components affected
LH2 vessel
Location type
Open
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational condition
Pre-event occurrences
leaks in the external shell of the vessel had been repaired six week before.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0
Environmental damage
0
Post-event summary
Minor damage to the vessel

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt
This is a rare case of deterioration of the annular space serving the insulation of a LH2 vessel, due to overpressure. It happened during the warming up of the vessel (which was highly probably almost empty), a procedure starting with the reduction of the vacuum in the insulation shell.
A possible escalation could have been the over-pressurisation of the internal shell due to too rapid heat inlet. Nevertheless, since the final goal of the operation as to bringing the vessel to room temperature, it is expected that venting system would have been able to deal with a higher hydrogen flow than the one planned. The vessel was anyhow equipped with pressure relief devises in case of internal over-pressurisation.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Release duration
unknown
Presumed ignition source
No release

References

Reference & weblink

Mishap no 86 in <br />
P. L. Ordin, Review of hydrogen accidents and incidents in NASA operations, 1974, NASA TM X-71565<br />
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19740020344

Lowesmith et al., Safety issues of the liquefaction, storage and transportation of liquid hydrogen: An analysis of incidents and HAZIDS, Int. J. Hydrogen energy (2014) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.08.002

Hankinson and Lowesmith, Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hydrogen Liquefaction, Storage and Transportation, FCH JU project IDEALHY, Deliverable 3.10 (2013)<br />
confidential<br />
(accessed October 2025)

JRC assessment