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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

Conventional fire on a CGH2 tube trailer

Event

Event ID
1187
Quality
Description
A tube trailer was driving on a highway, when the drivers noticed in the back camera smoke coming from the rear of the vehicle. After stopping the vehicle on the shoulder, they discovered a fire from the trailer's right rear inner tyre.
They attempted unsuccessfully to extinguish the fire using two on-board fire extinguishers. They driver notified the city fire department and the fire brigade arrived about 10 minutes later.
They succeeded to extinguish the fire in two hours and 50 minutes. The compressed hydrogen tube was made of carbon composite, and it was affected by the fire, probably starting burning. Because of this, or simply because of the raise in temperature, the fusible plug safety valve (TPRD) activated and released the hydrogen. The KHK report assumed a release without ignition.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Unignited Hydrogen Release
Nature of the consequences
Leak No Ignition (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Asia
Country
Japan
Date
Main component involved?
Tprd
How was it involved?
Correct Activation
Initiating cause
Over-Heating (Conventional Fire)
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was a conventional fire on a tire of the truck.
The safety system functioned as designed. The thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD) functioned as designed, by activating due to the increased temperature and releasing the hydrogen to avoid a failure of the tube under pressure.
Regarding the ROOT CAUSE, it must first be noted that regular inspections, and maintenance and replacement procedures are in place for critical components of heavy-duty vehicles, such as tyres and brakes. These measures should be able to prevent negative consequences to the rest of the system. This is even more important for hazardous material transports. Shortcoming in these procedures could be suggested as ROOT CAUSE.


Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
CGH2 tube trailer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
TPB, omposite vessel
Location type
Open
Operational condition
Description of the facility/unit/process/substances
DESCRIPTION OF THE UNIT
The KHK report mentions only one container. Due to the lack of details, the trailer configuration is unclear, but is very probably a multiple-tube trailer. For example Kawasaki trailer had 24 tubes of type III composites, with 200 l of water capacity each. Till 2013, the nominal pressure was 350 bar. From 2014, it was increased to 450 bar, with a total transport capacity of 260 kg of hydrogen.

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
0

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

The safety system functioned as designed. The thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD) opened because of the increased temperature and released the hydrogen to avoid a failure of the tube (vessel) under pressure.
The KHK report says that the hydrogen very probably did not ignite. This is a credible scenario, especially if the point of release is far away from the local conventional fire.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Presumed ignition source
No ignition

References

Reference & weblink

High Pressure Gas Accident Cases Database of the KHK (High Pressure Gas Safety Association): <br />
https://www.khk.or.jp/public_information/incident_investigation/hpg_inc… />
(accessed May 2025)

JRC assessment