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Clean Hydrogen Partnership

CGH2 trailer roll-over and fire

Event

Event ID
1001
Quality
Description
A tube trailer-tractor transporting compressed hydrogen was travelling on a highway, when the driver lost the control of the vehicle trying to avoid an obstacle on the road. The vehicle collided with the central guardrail, tipped over on the other side and the tubes became loose and spread across the motorway. At least one of the 22 tubes started releasing its contents. The tractor caught fire, and probably because of this, also the leaking hydrogen ignited and the fire propagated. The sources are unclear on the number of the tubes which eventually released their content.
The first responders created a safety distance of 300 m and interrupted the traffic in both directions on the highway and on the parallel roads. They used a thermal imaging camera to determine the locations where the hydrogen was released and concentrated the efforts on cooling the hydrogen tubes. Since closing the valves on the tubes would have been a too great risk, it was decided to let the hydrogen burn and extinguish by controlling the fire. As soon as the flow of hydrogen had stopped, the tubes were inspected. Few tubes that had not yet been emptied, were emptied manually by the experts of the transporting company using a blow-off installation. The tubes and the truck were then recovered by means of a crane.
The road surface had to be repaired, because it had been exposed to temperature up to 2000 degree Celsius and half-meter holes had formed. The highway remained closed one week.
Event Initiating system
Classification of the physical effects
Hydrogen Release and Ignition
Nature of the consequences
Fire (No additional details provided)
Macro-region
Europe
Country
Belgium
Date
Main component involved?
Valve (Generic)
How was it involved?
Rupture
Initiating cause
Impact, Rollover, Crash
Root causes
Root CAUSE analysis
The INITIATING CAUSE was the release of hydrogen from a tube valve broken by the impact on the ground. it is unclear if the initial fire was a conventional fire due to the truck impact or the ignition of the released hydrogen. Certain is that this escalated, because the fire caused the hydrogen release from other tubes, probably due to activation of their TPRD’s.
The reason for the driver to lose control was a reserve wheel on the road, lost by a previous vehicle due to the failure of a welding fixing the wheel.
The loss of control could be attributed to a human error. However, this is also a case of conventional material failure: losing a wheel on a road is the effect of inadequate inspection and maintenance of conventional vehicle components.

Facility

Application
Hydrogen Transport And Distribution
Sub-application
CGH2 tube trailer
Hydrogen supply chain stage
Hydrogen Transport (No additional details provided)
All components affected
CGH2 tube-trailer, 22 hydrogen tubes
Location type
Open
Operational condition

Emergency & Consequences

Number of injured persons
0
Number of fatalities
1
Post-event summary
The driver died due to vehicle crash. The road surface had to be repaired, because it had been exposed to temperature up to 2000 degree Celsius and half-meter holes had formed. The highway remained closed one week.

Lesson Learnt

Lesson Learnt

Based on the lesson learnt during this and similar incidents, the following guidance was issued to Dutch first responders:
In the event of incidents involving hydrogen, the five most important aspects in the first phase of incident response are:
(1) Start the procedure for incident for the hazardous materials (IBGS), because it cannot be known beforehand how large the area of effect is (determine the line of fire and stay upwind).
(2) Do not extinguish a hydrogen fire, but cool (radiated) objects where necessary.
(3) Always cool a radiated hydrogen tank with sufficient water. Prevent water from contacting the Thermal Pressure Relief Device (TPRD, fuse on the blow-off valve). This will cause the TPRD to no longer work, which may result in pressure build-up and an explosion.
(4) Always use an explosion hazard meter and a thermal imaging camera to make the leak and/or fire visible.
(5) Keep sufficient distance from the object where hydrogen is present due to the risk of blowing off and/or escalation.
(a) The distance to be used differs per scenario / installation size.
(b) Measuring equipment cannot be used to determine safe or unsafe areas; keep to standard 25 meters.

Event Nature

Release type
gas
Involved substances (% vol)
H2 100%
Actual pressure (MPa)
20
Design pressure (MPa)
20
Presumed ignition source
Not reported

References

Reference & weblink

Infoblad energietransitie voor incidentbestrijder (2022, pages 33-35)<br />
https://nipv.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/20220621-NIPV-Infoblad-Energ… />
(accessed December 2024)

Margreet Spoelstra (NIPV), Lessen uit waterstofincidenten, WP2 Risicobeheersing en incidentbestrijding<br />
https://nlhydrogen.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/WP2-Lessons-Learned-wa… />
(accessed Dec 2024)

HLN News of 30/01/2017

`There are no picture of the early intervention. Here picture taken during the last phase, when the fire was estinguished.<br />
DaveyPhotography<br />
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=wqkJldAqd-U<br />
(accessed December 2024)

FCH 2 JU HYRESPONSE project <br />
Public Deliverable D2.2 - http://www.hyresponse.eu/deliverables.php<br />
http://www.hyresponse.eu/deliverables.php<br />
(accessed January 2023)

JRC assessment